Geoffrey McDonald: The Malheur Occupation and the Land Question

Geoffrey McDonald, der Verantwortliche für die Webseite Ruthless Criticism (sozusagen dem US-amerikanischen GegenStandpunkt), hat einen Artikel in Counterpunch untergebracht:
„The Malheur Occupation and the Land Question“
Es geht zentral um die Entwicklung der Eigentumsfrage, das Verhältnis von Staat und Privateigentümern und der Ultrarechten in den USA.

1 Antwort auf „Geoffrey McDonald: The Malheur Occupation and the Land Question“

  1. 1 j. 04. Februar 2016 um 23:10 Uhr

    die amis haben halt zu wenig (oder zuviel?) hegel (nich original auf die schnelle -ka,obs hinhaut, nich überlesen) gelesn, naja, stimmt nich ganz, aber …

    (der link funktioniert irgendwie nicht mehr, probiers nachm abschicken nochmal und lösch das drunter raus, wenn er läuft)

    Jana schreibt:
    8. August 2012 um 19:57
    nu muß der hegel in english glesn werdn?
    dank für den link!
    und ja, dat allett is niemalsnich ot,
    aber sowas mag (like hegel andret) wohl keener bgreife?

    “…metaphor of the “struggle to death” between the master and slave, which
    for Hegel provided the key to the unfolding of freedom in world history
    and which he first elaborated in The Phenomenology of Mind, written in
    Jena in 1805-6 (the first year of the Haitian nation’s existence) and
    published in 1807 (the year of the British abolition of the slave trade).
    Where, indeed? The intellectual historians of German philosophy know
    only one place to look for the answer: the writings of other intellectuals.
    Perhaps it was Fichte, writes George Armstrong Kelly, although “the
    problem of lordship and bondage is essentially Platoni~.J”u~d~it h Shklar
    takes the common route of connecting Hegel’s discussion to Aristotle.
    Otto Poggeler-and there is no finer name in German Hegel scholarship-
    says that the metaphor does not come from even the ancients, but
    is a totally “abstract” example.’O Only one scholar, Pierre-Franklin Tavarks,
    has ever actually made the connection of Hegel and Haiti, basing
    his argument on evidence that Hegel read the French abolitionist, the
    Abbi. Gr6goi1-e.7(1H is work, written in the early 1990s, has as far as I can
    tell been resoundingly ignored by the Hegel establishment.) But even
    Tavarks deals with the later Hegel, after the master-slave dialectic had
    been c~nceived.~N’o one has dared to suggest that the idea for the dia-
    lectic of lordship and bondage came to Hegel in Jena in the years 1803-5
    from reading the press-journals and newspapers. And yet this selfsame
    Hegel, in this very Jena period during which the master-slave dialectic
    was first conceived, made the following notation:
    Reading the newspaper in early morning is a kind of realistic morning
    prayer. One orients one’s attitude against the world and toward
    God [in one case], or toward that which the world is [in the other].
    The former gives the same security as the latter, in that one knows
    where one stands.73
    We are left with only two alternatives. Either Hegel was the blindest
    of all the blind philosophers of freedom in Enlightenment Europe,
    surpassing Locke and Rousseau by far in his ability to block out reality
    right in front of his nose (the print right in front of his nose at the breakfast
    table); or Hegel knew-knew about real slaves revolting successfully
    against real masters, and he elaborated his dialectic of lordship and
    bondage deliberately within this contemporary ~ontext.’~
    -72. I have yet to see Tavarks’s original article, “Hegel et Haiti, ou le silence de Hegel
    sur Saint-Domingue” in the Port-au-Prince journal Chemins Critiques 2 (May 1992): 113-31.Nor have I read his doctoral dissertation, “Hegel, critique de l’Afriquen (Doctorat, Paris-1,1990). From the article I have seen, it appears that he deals predominantly with French rather than German sources and that he has not consulted contemporary journals; his conjecture seems to be that Hegel’s concern for abolitionism came later, in the 1820s, and may have been a nostalgia for his early revolutionary dreams. Schuller, Die Deutsche Rezeption haitianzscher Geschichte in der ersten Halfte des 19.Jahrhunderts, briefly mentions Hegel, but only
    his late writings (1820s), and does not suggest the direct influence I am arguing for here; nor does she suggest that Hegel read Minema
    “Hegel understands the position of the master in both political and economic
    terms. In the System der Sittlichkeit (1803): “The master is in possession
    of an overabundance of physical necessities generally, and the other
    [the slave] in the lack thereof.”80 At first consideration the master’s situation
    is “independent, and its essential nature is to be for itself”; whereas
    “the other,” the slave’s position, “is dependent, and its essence is life or
    existence for another.”81 The slave is characterized by the lack of recognition
    he receives. He is viewed as “a thing”; “thinghood” is the essence of
    slave consciousness-as it was the essence of his legal status under the
    Code Noir (PM, p. 235). But as the dialectic develops, the apparent dominance
    of the master reverses itself with his awareness that he is in fact
    totally dependent on the slave. One has only to collectivize the figure of
    the master in order to see the descriptive pertinence of Hegel’s analysis:
    the slave-holding class is indeed totally dependent on the institution of
    slavery for the “overabundance” that constitutes its wealth. This class is
    thus incapable of being the agent of historical progress without annihilatslaves
    ing its own e~istence.~B’u t then the slaves (again, collectivizing the figure)
    achieve self-consciousness by demonstrating that they are not things,
    not objects, but subjects who transform material nature.83 Hegel’s text
    becomes obscure and falls silent at this point of realizati~nB.~u~t given
    the historical events that provided the context for The Phenomenology of
    Mind, the inference is clear. Those who once acquiesced to slavery demonstrate
    their humanity when they are willing to risk death rather than
    remain subj~gatedT.~h~e law (the Code Noir!) that acknowledges them
    merely as “a thing” can no longer be considered bindings6 although be-
    fore, according to Hegel, it was the slave himself who was responsible
    for his lack of freedom by initially choosing life over liberty, mere selfpre~
    ervation.~In’ The Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel insists that freedom
    cannot be granted to slaves from above. The self-liberation of the slave is
    required through a “trial by death”: “And it is solely by risking life that
    freedom is obtained. . . . The individual, who has not staked his life, may,
    no doubt, be recognized as a Person [the agenda of the abolitionists!]; but
    he has not attained the truth of this recognition as an independent selfconsciousness”
    (PM, p. 233). The goal of this liberation, out of slavery,
    cannot be subjugation of the master in turn, which would be merely to
    repeat the master’s “existential impasse,”88b ut, rather, elimination of the
    institution of slavery altogether. …”
    -It is the System der Sittlichkeit that first registers Hegel’s reading of Adam Smith and also the unequal relationship of lord (Herr) and servant (Knecht) that is “established along with the inequality of the power of life” (SS, p. 34)-although these two themes do not yet come together. Hegel is concerned with the exchange of “surplus” as a “system of needs” that is “empirically unendingo-that “borderless” commerce by which a people is “dissolved” (that is, returns to a “state of nature”?) (SS, pp. 82, 84-5). The fact that in the exchange of private property “things have equality with other things” becomes the basis of legal right but only through contract as the “binding middle term.” It is impossible to say of life, as one can say of other things, that the individual “possesses” it; hence the connection of “lordship” [Hewschf] and “bondage” [Knechtschaf] is one of “relationlessness”; see SS, pp. 32-37.
    Hegel notes that “among many peoples the woman is sold off by the parents:-but this
    cannot be the basis of a marriage contract between man and wife” (SS, p. 37). (But what of his own European culture where slaves are bought and sold?) “There is no contract with the bondsman [Knecht/ either, but there can be a contract with someone else about the bondsman or the woman“ (SS, p. 37). Thus „the situation of slaves [Sklavenstand] is not a social class (Stand), for it is onli formally a universal. The slave [der Sklave] is related as a singularity [Einzelnes] to his master” (SS, p. 63). The lecture manuscript from which the System der Sittlichkeit was written up (since lost) degenerated into “mere history,” according to Haym (Rudolf, Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit [Berlin, 18571; quoted in “CR,” p. 164); it would be interesting to know just what this “mere history” concerned.
    -83. The stress on labor is intriguing. The slave materializes his own subjectivity
    through labor. Hegel seems to privilege craft or agricultural labor (as did Adam Smith,
    given the dehumanizing effects of the factory). But reading backward from Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of history (discussed below), this attitude toward labor describes the transformation within the slave’s consciousness from an earlier, ‘:4frican” spirit of seeing nature as itself subjectivity, to a modern spirit, wherein working on nature is an expression of one’s own subjectivity
    -Marxists have interpreted the slave’s coming to self-consciousness as a metaphor for the working class’s overcoming of false consciousness: the class-in-itself becomes for-itself. But they have criticized Hegel for not taking the next step to revolutionary practice. I am arguing that the slaves of Saint-Domingue were, as Hegel knew, taking that step for him.
    (aber ich wollt eigentlich den hegel bis zum vom blättchen zitierten “neger” lesen in den vl-s …..mach ich dann aber auch ab morgen wieder…)

    Jana schreibt:
    8. August 2012 um 22:23
    “If the historical facts about freedom can be ripped
    out of the narratives told by the victors and salvaged for our own time,
    then the project of universal freedom does not need to be discarded but,
    rather, redeemed and reconstituted on a different basis. Hegel’s moment
    of clarity of thought would need to be juxtaposed to that of others at
    the time: Toussaint-Louverture, Wordsworth, the AbbC GrCgoire, even
    Dessalines. For all his brutality and revenge against whites, Dessalines saw
    the realities of European racism most clearly. Even more, Hegel’s moment
    would need to be juxtaposed to the moments of clarity in action: the
    French soldiers sent by Napoleon to the colony who, upon hearing these
    former slaves singing the “Marseillaise,” wondered aloud if they were not
    fighting on the wrong side; the Polish regiment under Leclerc’s command
    who disobeyed orders and refused to drown six hundred captured Saint-
    Domiguans (see BJ, p. 318).lZ7There are many examples of such clarity,
    and they belong to no side, no one group exclusively. What if every time
    that the consciousness of individuals surpassed the confines of present
    constellations of power in perceiving the concrete meaning of freedom,
    this were valued as a moment, however transitory, of the realization of
    absolute spirit? What other silences would need to be broken? What undisciplined
    stories would be told?”
    126. The master-slave dialectic becomes allegorical in Hegel’s writings, a metaphor
    for any relation of dependency, not only the struggle to death, but just as often thoskthat
    were meant to be outgrown. Some examples: In the Enrjclopediu (1845), the subjection of the servant is “‘a necessary moment in the education (Bzldung) of every man. . . . No man can, without this will-breaking discipline, become free and worthy to command’”; on nations: “‘Bondage and tyranny are necessary things in the history of peoples’”; from the Philosophy ofReligion: “‘I am not one of the fighters locked in the battle, but both, and I am the struggle itself. I am fire and water’” (“N,” p. 271). It is in the 1825 summer semester on the phenomenology of splr~th at we have a erslon of master and servant stressing as the good aspect of belng a sertant the moment of freedom In work ~tself,s ee Gunzel~n Schmld Uoerr, Sznnlzchkezt und Herrschaft Zur konzeptualzsze~ungd er znneren Natur bez Hegel und Freud (Kon~gstelnITaunus1, 980), pp 46-47
    ich meine mal,
    mit marxens kritik an hegel
    soll da schon viel gewonnen worden sein und was nu der marx nich mehr jeschafft hat
    wollt zb “die psychologie des bürgerlichen individuums” bequatschen,
    aber will ja niemand,
    also belassen wa den hegel als rassist und n marx als antisemiten und…und die beziehungen der menschen in the master-slave dialectic …natürlich auch die der eltern mitn kiddies hmm, wo käm ma denn sonst hin…
    danke für dies pdf!

    der „antisemit“ marx

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